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"To govern simply by statute, and to reduce all to order by means of
pains and penalties, is to render the people evasive, and devoid of any
sense of shame.
"To govern upon principles of virtue, and to reduce them to order by
the Rules of Propriety, would not only create in them the sense of
shame, but would moreover reach them in all their errors."'
Confucius, c. 500 B.C.
"When law succeeds, it puts itself out of business."
-That statement is not always true, of course. The term law is broad
and imprecise. It certainly is true, however, for activist regulatory
forms of law, such as environmental law. The purpose of law in the
activist mode is to change the norms and behavior of a community or
subcommunity. Complete success would eliminate the need for addi-
tional legal acts to reinforce the message and would undermine the
law's continued reason for being. Conversely, the more obvious and
intrusive legal machinery is at any given time or place, the less suc-
cessful the law has been in achieving its ultimate goal of "voluntary ' 2
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Shriver & Jacobson, New York and Washington, D.C.; Julien and Virginia Cornell Professor of
Environmental Law and Litigation, Yale University (on leave of absence, 1993-1994). Assistant
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1. THE WISDOM OF CONFUCIUS bk. 2, anal. 3, at 12 (William Jennings trans., 1990). "In
this passage, imposed order based on regulation and edict is contrasted with political harmony
effected through example, participation, and moral edification." DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T.
AMEs, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUS 175 (1987) (citation omitted).
2. The term voluntary compliance is probably too well established to be expunged from law-
yers' vocabularies, but it is ambiguous and potentially misleading. The word voluntary implies
that the motivations for compliance are internal. In fact, a private actor will often comply with
legal norms in whole or in part because of the system of incentives created by the law. In this
situation, compliance is "voluntary" only in the sense that no one has to invoke the formal
machinery of law enforcement to achieve its purposes. Cf E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha:
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Breathe easy, environmental lawyers of the world: we're not quite
there yet. Environmental law was the single largest growth area for
lawyers in the last decade.3 Beginning slowly in about 1970, environ-
mental law - and the demand for environmental lawyers -
mushroomed in importance in the 1980s. 4 This dramatic growth was
fed in large part by the enormous appetite of the Superfund program
for "transaction costs," principally in the form of lawyers. 5 But as
environmental law gradually succeeds at changing the prevailing
norms of society, particularly in the business world,6 the transition
from environmental law to environmental management has already
begun.
A window has recently opened into the new world, in which imple-
menting environmental norms in practice is more important than es-
tablishing them in theory. It is a remarkable document: Total Quality
Management: A Framework for Pollution Prevention, by the Quality
Environmental Management Subcommittee of the President's Com-
mission on Environmental Quality.7 The PCEQ-TQM Report is a
document with profound implications and should be required reading
for anyone who is serious about the environment. The report ema-
nates from an unlikely source for innovation - a subcommittee of a
now-disbanded presidential commission.
The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV.
125, 152 (stating that "the most effective kind of power [is] the kind that does not have to be used
to be effective").
3. See PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT 134 (1993) ("Environmental law has been for some time the fastest-growing sector
of the American bar.").
4. See Alain L. Sanders, Battling Crimes Against Nature, TIME, Mar. 12, 1990, at 54, 54
(describing 20,000 environmental lawyers as "some of the most sought after professionals"); see
also E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. Ky. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (noting
that environmental law has become like tax law - a significant factor in every business
transaction).
5. LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE-SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES AND TRANSAC-
TION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES at xii, 25 (1993) (reporting that transaction costs exceeded
60% of costs for 50% of firms spending over $1000, and that almost two-thirds of the transac-
tions costs were for legal services); see generally JAN P. ACTON ET AL., SUPERFUND AND
TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS
(1992).
6. To date, environmental law has primarily focused on controlling pollution from large in-
dustrial sources. If progress is to continue in the years ahead, the focus will have to shift to
controlling the pollution from smaller sources and from consumer behavior. See Francis S.
Blake, The Economic Impacts of Environmental Regulation, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr., Sum-
mer 1990, at 23, 56; William K. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
351, 352-53 (1989).
7. QUALITY ENVTL. MANAGEMENT SUBCOMM., PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON ENVTL. QUAL-
rrY, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (1993)
[hereinafter PCEQ-TQM REPORT].
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On July 23, 1991, President Bush appointed the President's Com-
mission on Environmental Quality (PCEQ), chaired by Michael R.
Deland, who was then chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality.8 The twenty-five-member commission consisted primarily of
CEOs of major U.S. corporations, joined by three environmentalists
and two university presidents. At the same time the PCEQ-TQM Re-
port appeared, the PCEQ itself produced a report describing its own
work and conclusions, which was released on January 13, 1993, one
week before the Clinton administration took office. This report, Part-
nerships to Progress,9 describes what President Bush had called a
"'new environmentalism' 
- a more productive, less adversarial mode
of environmental action that 'harnesses the power of the marketplace
in service of the environment.' "10 Had President Bush been reelected,
those seeking clues to environmental policy in a second Bush term
might have eagerly devoured this report. Coming out as it did, a week
before the inauguration of his successor, it received somewhat less at-
tention, to put it mildly. 1
Unlike most presidential commissions, which merely issue advi-
sory reports and recommendations, the Bush PCEQ was tasked actu-
ally to "develop and test practical, innovative ideas"12 through a series
of ten demonstration projects. Of these, the most interesting and sig-
nificant was the project to apply to pollution prevention projects the
principles of Total Quality Management (TQM), an approach to man-
aging organizations developed by the late W. Edwards Deming and
widely applied in Japan.1 3 The PCEQ assembled a Quality Environ-
mental Management Subcommittee intending to "demonstrate the via-
bility of Total Quality Management (TQM) as a method for achieving
pollution prevention" (p. vii). The subcommittee's PCEQ-TQM Re-
port concludes that "Total Quality Management (TQM) and Pollution
Prevention are complementary concepts" (p. ix) and that "TQM offers
8. 1991 PUB. PAPERS app. A, at 1677 (July 23, 1991). See Exec. Order No. 12,737, 3 C.F.R.
324 (1990), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. III 1991) (establishing the PCEQ). Although
the author of this review served as general counsel of the EPA in the Bush administration, he left
the administration in August 1991, shortly after the members of the PCEQ were appointed, and
had no involvement with their work.
9. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PARTNERSHIPS TO PROGRESS (1993) [herein-
after PCEQ REPORT].
10. Letter of Transmittal, in PCEQ REPORT, supra note 9, at 2.
11. It should be noted, however, that the Clinton administration has subsequently endorsed
the concept of "partnerships" in the environmental area. AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RE-
SULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BET'rER & COSTS LEss 63 (1993) (Report of
the Natl. Performance Review).
12. Letter of Transmittal, supra note 10, at 2.
13. An excellent account of Deming's life and an introduction to his ideas can also be found
in his recent obituary. John Holusha, W. Edwards Deming, Expert on Business Management,
Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1993, at A13; see also infra Part V (discussing TQM as applied
to environmental management).
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an approach that all companies can use to achieve environmental im-
provements" (p. x).
The report looks like a typical, slick corporate annual report, com-
plete with glossy, four-color photos, charts, and graphics. The aura of
corporate boosterism, however, should not obscure the extraordinary
significance of the report's contents. The PCEQ-TQM Report on the
use of Total Quality Management in preventing pollution is an impor-
tant document that signifies a basic transformation in the history of
environmental regulation in the United States. It should not pass un-
noticed into the oblivion of federal depository library shelves. Page
after page of the PCEQ-TQM Report relates stunning success stories
of rapid and dramatic reductions in pollution that are uncommon, if
not unprecedented, in the history of U.S. environmental law. 14 The
results reportedly' 5 achieved at the twelve sites participating in the
demonstration projects were nothing less than dramatic:
Dow Chemical achieved a 29 percent reduction in ethylene oxide fu-
gitive emissions and preliminary results on their waste management pro-
ject indicate a 67 percent reduction in the amount of material sent to
waste treatment facilities.
GE estimates that 1,1,1 trichloroethane use will be decreased by 95
percent by year-end.
DuPont's generation of ammonium sulfate was reduced from more
than 100 million pounds per year to less than 40 million pounds per year.
International Paper's Androscoggin Mill reduced fiber lost to the pa-
per machine sewers from 60 tons to less than 25 tons per day through a
rigorous self-audit and the development of an innovative mobile recovery
pump. In addition... loading to the wastewater treatment system was
reduced which improved effluent quality by more than 50 percent.
Ford is replacing, on a business plan cycle basis, its trichloroethyline
(TCE) vapor degreasers with an aqueous degreasing system that demon-
strated superior processing quality and improved environmental condi-
tions for employees and the community.
At the 3M plant, generation of waste was reduced by 10 percent.
Procter & Gamble's Mehoopany, Pennsylvania, paper and pulp man-
ufacturing plant eliminated the use of chlorine for converting broke
bleaching and improved pulp washing which decreased sulfur dioxide,
ammonia and chloroform releases. [pp. 41-42]
The report summarizes the results of the project by stating:
[S]ignificant pollution prevention and economic savings ...resulted
14. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing the failures of traditional, legalistic environmental
regulation).
15. Some caution is appropriate in evaluating the reported results. The sources for the infor-
mation described in the PCEQ-TQM Report were the companies themselves, and the subcom-
mittee did not independently verify their claims. In the related context of the EPA's 33/50
program, intended to encourage companies to reduce their releases of toxic chemicals into the
environment, see text accompanying note 42; some have voiced skepticism, contending among
other things that the claimed reductions either are spurious or would have been made anyway for
other reasons.
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from a dozen diverse demonstration projects and... [i]n the aggregate,
these projects accomplished the following:
Eliminated millions of pounds of pollutants from manufacturing
processes.
Saved substantial sums of money.
Increased the efficiency or effectiveness of the production process.
Improved the quality of products and services.
Enhanced public perception of the company or its products.
Improved employee morale. [p. vii]
The PCEQ-TQM Report concludes: "If these projects are any indica-
tion of the power of TQM to reduce or prevent pollution, then the
QEM [Quality Environmental Management] Subcommittee is confi-
dent in stating that, with the proper incentives and flexibility to inno-
vate, private-sector voluntary programs are a cost-effective and
expeditious route to improving the quality of the environment" (p. x).
To the sophisticated postmodem lawyer, grown jaded on zero-sum
games and the prisoner's dilemma, it all sounds too good to be true.
But if TQM really does work in practice, perhaps eventually it can
also work in theory. 16 Besides, it is not as if our existing technologies
for implementing pollution controls are so successful that we have
nothing to learn.
III
The success stories related in the PCEQ-TQM Report contrast
sharply with the disappointing record of traditional strategies used in
U.S. environmental law to achieve its stated goals. 17 The staple ap-
proach used by environmental law in the United States to regulate
pollution during the modem era from about 1970 to the present has
been government standard setting through legalistic bureaucracy.18
This approach to pollution control involves an elaborate, time-con-
suming legal-political process 19 to develop legally enforceable pollu-
tion limits. The government can set these limits in various ways,
16. In a recent article applying TQM principles to a different legal problem, the author of
this review contends that TQM can be understood as a way of restructuring payoffs in existing
organizations and thereby potentially transcending static zero-sum games. See E. Donald Elliott,
TQM-ing OMB. Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and
What President Clinton Should Do About It, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 167.
17. For a typical statement of goals for a modem U.S. environmental statute, see the Clean
Air Act § 101(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)-(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
18. See E. Donald Elliott & E. Michael Thomas, Chemicals, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW § 17.1(B)(3), at 1257, 1266-70 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993); Elliott, supra
note 4, at 3-5.
19. For fictionalized accounts of this process in (in)action, see Douglas M. Costle, Brave New
Chemical. The Future Regulatory History of Phlogiston, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 195 (1981); Elliott,
supra note 16, at 171-74; see also JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S
VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1976) (EPA's first general counsel
describing difficulties encountered in developing regulations).
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based on technology or on scientific predictions of the effects of pollu-
tion on public health and the environment. The limits can allow vary-
ing degrees of weight to be given to economics and other
countervailing considerations. Pollution limits can be site specific, ap-
plicable to an industry or industry segment, or even nationwide in ap-
plication. Whatever their basis and scope, however, the basic
standard-setting approach predominantly used to regulate pollution in
the United States requires, as an essential first step to pollution reduc-
tions, that government officials determine what an acceptable amount
of pollution would be.
The government standard-setting approach has many advantages.
First and foremost, government standard setting is symbolically and
politically satisfying to those who engage in these activities.20 Govern-
ment standard setting allows politicians and bureaucrats to tell them-
selves and others that their actions are having an important effect on
cleaning up the environment. 21 Because government officials are typi-
cally persons who have bypassed greater personal economic opportu-
nities for public service, an economist would say that they have
revealed a preference 22 involving a higher-than-average taste for doing
what people in government do - perhaps exercising control, perhaps
benefiting others. Either way, one should never underestimate the im-
portance of personal psychic satisfaction to the regulators in influenc-
ing the selection of regulatory techniques. Indeed, it is possible to
speculate that the well-documented resistance of career bureaucrats
toward economic incentive approaches to environmental regulation 23
is attributable in large part to the fact that the creation of a market in
pollution rights eliminates most opportunities for bureaucrats to do
the things that make them feel that they are having an important effect
for the public good. It is no exaggeration to say that most career envi-
ronmental regulators have invested their lives in the proposition that
government standard setting is an important activity and therefore
20. For an account of environmental lawmaking that sees "competitive credit-claiming" by
political entrepreneurs as the essential driving force, see generally E. Donald Elliott et al., To-
ward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L EcON. &
ORG. 313 (1985).
21. The title of the fine book by the EPA's first general counsel - CLEANING Up AMERICA
- illustrates the point. See QUARLES, supra note 19. When one is writing regulations, one does
feel as though one is "cleaning up America." Alas, however, the two are different, and, as
Quarles and other critics recognize, we should measure our success in the environmental area not
by counting numbers and pages of regulations but rather by assessing actual changes in environ-
mental quality. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 6-7 (1990).
22. For an explanation of "revealed preferences" in economics, see E.J. MISHAN, COST-BEN-
EFIT ANALYSIS 402-08 (4th ed. 1988); Marcel K. Richter, Revealed Preference Theory, in 4 THE
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 166 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
23. See, eg., BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND REGULATORY REFORM: THE
EPA AND EMISSIONS TRADING (1988); STEPHEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECON-
OMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1981).
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would find it personally very difficult to support changes that would
minimize their own centrality.
In addition to making bureaucrats, politicians, and the public feel
that something is being done to control pollution, an additional benefit
of the government standard-setting approach is that it requires, and
therefore also creates incentives to produce, a great deal of informa-
tion about environmental conditions and pollution control techniques.
Most of what we know about the costs and benefits of environmental
protection and various control techniques has been generated as a by-
product of the environmental regulatory effort.
However, among the notable drawbacks of government standard
setting as an approach to pollution control is that it is a slow, ineffi-
cient, and expensive way of actually reducing pollution. Critics across
the political spectrum have documented that our present standard-set-
ting approach to pollution control works, but that it works slowly and
crudely and wastes an enormous amount of time and money. En-
vironmentalist Barry Commoner has been among the most outspoken
critics, beginning with a 1987 speech, provocatively titled "Failure of
the Environmental Effort." 24 Commoner later elaborated on his argu-
ment in his book, Making Peace with the Planet.25 In both, Com-
moner mounts an impressive case, backed by official facts and figures,
to show that progress in actually cleaning up the environment has
been quite modest, despite an enormous effort. The key to Com-
moner's critique is its point of view: rather than evaluating the success
or failure of the environmental effort in terms of intermediate bureau-
cratic measures, such as numbers of statutes passed or regulations is-
sued or dollars spent, Commoner looks at the ultimate question:
whether the environment is actually getting better as a result of our
efforts. Although Commoner's conclusion - "failure" - is probably
too extreme and simplistic,2 6 as his proposed solution - socialism -
certainly is, Commoner nonetheless mounts an impressive case that
the U.S. strategy for controlling pollution through setting governmen-
tal standards has been a disappointment.
Critics from the opposite end of the political spectrum generally
share Commoner's essential conclusions about the ineffectiveness of
government standard setting as a pollution control strategy. Con-
servative critics also argue that centralized, bureaucratic standard set-
24. Barry Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,195 (June 1988).
25. BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET (1990).
26. Elsewhere, the author of this review endorses the "qualified success" judgment of another
EPA critic, Steven Cohen. See Steven A. Cohen, EPA: A Qualfied Success, in CONTROVERSIES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 174 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1986), cited with approval in
Elliott & Thomas, supra note 18, § 17.5(d), at 1351 n.565. But see Reilly, supra note 6, at 352
(By comparison to other domestic initiatives, the environmental efforts of the 1970s are "one of
the great success stories of American life and history.").
1846 [Vol. 92:1840
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1846 1993-1994
Environmental TQM
ting by government is an inherently inefficient and cumbersome way to
control pollution.27 Because the conservative critique is typically ex-
pressed in the language of "inefficiency," and the costs of inefficiency
are usually measured in money, some people do not appreciate that
the true price for the misallocation of our scarce environmental re-
sources is paid not only in dollars but also in other environmental
problems left unaddressed.28 In the United States, we spend roughly
the same percentage of our gross national product on pollution con-
trols as do other advanced industrialized nations; I suspect that we get
far less substantive benefit in risk reduction for our money,29 in part
because our effort is "an inch wide and a mile deep" - focusing on
relatively few substances that we regulate very heavily - but also be-
cause a large percentage of what we spend is wasted on transaction
costs, largely made up of lawyers, consultants, and delay.30
There are now a number of fine academic reviews of the U.S. envi-
ronmental effort over the last quarter century. 31 They, too, generally
reach a mixed conclusion like those of Commoner and the conserva-
tive critics: Yes, we have made measurable progress in many areas,
actually cleaning up some areas of the environment and slowing the
rate of environmental degradation in others. Overall, however, the ef-
fort leaves plenty of room for improvement: the rate of progress has
been slow, the costs have been high, and much, much more remains to
be done. This has led some, including the author of this review, to
27. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLIrICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992); RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN A. BADEN, NATURAL
RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1983).
28. See Elliott, supra note 4, at 6, 7. But see David Durenberger, A Dissenting Voice, EPA J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 49 (opposing comparative risk assessment as a method of establishing priori-
ties and arguing that money "wasted" on programs like Superfund would not in fact be reallo-
cated to other, more beneficial programs, such as reducing infant mortality).
29. See Elliott, supra note 4, at 2.
30. See generally DIXON ET AL., supra note 5, ACTON ET AL., supra note 5.
31. See, e.g., LANDY ET AL., supra note 21; R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); Cohen, supra note 26; Richard J. Lazarus,
The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 348. Lazarus cites numerous examples of regulatory fail-
ure but concludes that
this nation's accomplishments in seeking to produce a legal regime for environmental pro-
tection have been extraordinary.... Viewed from this perspective, repeated regulatory fail-
ure could be seen as the necessary cost of our attempt to address pressing environmental
problems in the face of scientific uncertainty. There was not sufficient time to delay govern-
mental action until its environmental objectives could have been fairly and accurately
defined.
Id. at 348. See also SHABECOFF, supra note 3, at 134 ("Yet many environmentalists and other
commentators, including [Environmental Law Institute President J. William] Futrell have ex-
pressed disappointment over the results [under the environmental laws of the 1970s]."); Richard
B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
1, 4-6 (1985) (criticizing bureaucratic standard setting as "Soviet-style centralized planning"
applied to the environment).
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conclude that "you can't get there from here" 32 - that the strategies
of centralized, bureaucratic control by government, while necessary,
will not be sufficient to deal with the plethora of small, diffuse sources
of pollution that we must control if we are to make continued progress
in the years ahead.33
The Gore-Browner era in environmental protection is about to
launch the country into a new round of ambitious statutory revisions.
In light of the long and well-documented record showing that promul-
gating more and better statutes and regulations is actually not a very
effective strategy for reducing pollution, perhaps it is time to look seri-
ously at the claims made in the PCEQ-TQM Report that an alterna-
tive strategy for reducing pollution will actually work.34
IV
One factor distinguishing the new approach to pollution reduction
described in the PCEQ-TQM Report from the traditional government
standard-setting approach is the role of the government.
The traditional government standard-setting approach makes com-
plex information processing by government officials a precondition to
pollution reductions. 35 Necessary actions by government take the
form of rulemaking and judicial review, often followed by a separate
stage of implementation, such as the writing of permits on the state
level, to translate the general standards into source-specific emission
limitations. Because the government's resources are limited and due
process is slow, it often takes the government a very long time to regu-
late individual pollution sources. 36
32. See Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, "You can't get therefrom here," FORBES, July 6,
1992, at 59, 61 (quoting the author of this review).
33. See Reilly, supra note 6, at 352-53.
34. It is important to be clear that the author is not in favor of replacing government regula-
tion with the other approaches discussed elsewhere in this review but advocates a "hybrid" sys-
tem in which both regulatory standard setting and incentive-based approaches have a role to
play. See Elliott, supra note 4, at 19-21; Elliott & Thomas, supra note 18, § 17.5(D), at 1352-53.
35. Recently, several other commentators in the environmental field have begun to focus on
the information-processing demands of the existing regulatory regime. See John S. Applegate,
The Perils of Unreasonable Risk- Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control,
91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 261 (1991); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong
Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 327 (1991);
see also E. Donald Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation
Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1367 (1985) (arguing that legal institutions ought to be designed
with reference to the availability of information).
36. One clear example of the long delays that afflict the government standard-setting process
is the history of § 112 of the Clean Air Act concerning air toxis. Since § 112 was enacted in
1970, the EPA managed to regulate only seven substances before Congress in 1990 massively
altered the statutory scheme in frustration with the slow pace of regulation. See Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685-86, amended by Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (codified as
amended at 42 § U.S.C. 7412 (Supp. IV 1992)); H.R. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 338-42
(1990), reprinted in relevant part in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3870-74.
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Even worse than the delay in setting standards, however, is the
perverse effect in the meantime of the threat that the government may
regulate later but refuse to give credit for previous reductions. This
threat tends to paralyze pollution sources, preventing them from tak-
ing independent action to reduce pollution since they may not receive
credit for these reductions later.
Moreover, at a crucial, symbolic, expressive level, the lesson of
command-and-control government regulation is that corporate pol-
luters will not take any action to reduce pollution unless confronted
with a governmental threat, "backed ultimately by the U.S. Army."' 37
To the extent that this assumption becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,
as noted in the epigram from Confucius, 38 the law may actually frus-
trate its own goals by teaching obedience rather than responsibility.
In contrast to the traditional standard-setting approach, in which
virtually nothing happens unless and until the government takes a se-
ries of complex actions, in the private pollution prevention programs
described in the PCEQ-TQM Report, the government is conspicuous
by its absence. The report hardly mentions the government and cer-
tainly does not portray it as the driving force behind any of the pollu-
tion reductions. That could easily lead the casual reader to the
mistaken conclusion that the dramatic pollution reductions described
in the report are entirely voluntary. They are "voluntary" in the lim-
ited sense that the government is not micromanaging or mandating the
specific actions taken. On the other hand, however, there is no reason
to believe that the corporate community is acting out of a sudden burst
of increased altruism.
I prefer the term private to the term voluntary for characterizing
the species of corporate behaviors described in the PCEQ-TQM Re-
port. In my view, private pollution prevention efforts are not truly
voluntary, in the sense of being exclusively self-motivated, but rather
stimulated in large part by successful government action in creating
appropriate and effective incentives for private action.39 In one sense,
of course, all government regulation involves creating incentives for
private action.4° What differs between traditional command-and-con-
37. Cf Arthur A. Le, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,
80 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1970) ("[B]ehind every final judgment procured in any court in this country
stands, ultimately, the United States Army .... ); E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages
Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053, 1068-71 (1989) (criticizing
punitive damage awards on similar grounds).
38. See text accompanying note 1, supra.
39. See supra note 2.
40. E. Donald Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317,
346 (1987) (defining regulation as "preserving the nominal freedom of individuals to make pri-
vate decisions... [while] altering the structure of incentives individuals face when making their
decisions"); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next Stage of
the Tort Revolution?, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1069, 1083 (1991) (Pfizer Distinguished Lecture on
Tort Law).
1849May 19941
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1849 1993-1994
Michigan Law Review
trol standard-setting regulation and so-called economic incentive-
based systems is the level of generality at which the government cre-
ates incentives.41 The difference in the nature of the incentives created
is not just a detail; it goes to the essence of effective government. After
all, the literature about regulation in general, and environmental regu-
lation in particular, is not rife with success stories. If in some areas
the government seems to have been unusually successful in achieving
its regulatory goals, it may be worthwhile to attempt to understand
the sources of the success and to learn lessons that may be replicated
in other areas.
One may properly criticize the PCEQ-TQM Report for not ad-
dressing with more thoughtfulness and in more detail the types of gov-
ernment actions that best facilitate successful private pollution-
prevention efforts. The only apparent reference in the report to the
government's role is a single parenthetical caveat, in which the report
maintains that "with the proper incentives and flexibility to innovate, "
private pollution-prevention efforts can be effective (p. x; emphasis
added). But in those few words lies quite a tale.
In the case of the private pollution-prevention efforts the PCEQ-
TQM Report describes, the government's role consisted of four steps:
(i) creating a system of general background incentives, in the form of
information that focused public pressure, as well as economic and
other incentives; (ii) issuing a public challenge to polluters to achieve a
clear goal of pollution reductions, formulated in broad, general terms;
(iii) offering positive rewards - as opposed to negative threats - in
terms of public recognition; and (iv) providing useful tools in the form
of information, but not mandating the details of how to achieve pollu-
tion reductions. Examples of government programs implementing
step three - providing positive reinforcement for desirable corporate
conduct through public recognition-include the industrial toxics pro-
ject - also known as the 33/50 program, because it seeks reductions
of toxic emissions by thirty-three percent by the end of 1992 and by
fifty percent by the end of 199542 - the Green Lights43 and Energy
Star 44 programs, and the EPA administrator's awards for environ-
41. See Colloquy, Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 463, 474 (1991) (remarks of author) (pointing out that traditional command-and-control
regulations also create incentives); see also Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environ-
mental Law, 41 S.C. L. REv. 733, 749-62 (1990) (describing the incentive effects of CERCLA).
Babich is a former student of mine, and we share a common approach of analyzing statutes in
terms of the incentives they create. This approach may, however, be somewhat older than either
of us. See Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666-86 (1971) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF AcCi-
DENTS (1970)) (suggesting the applicability of economic incentive analysis to pollution).
42. See EPA's Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849, 7861-64 (1991).
43. 57 Fed. Reg. 60,811 (1992).
44. Exec. Order No. 12,845, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,887 (1993).
1850 [Vol. 92:1840
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1850 1993-1994
Environmental TQM
mental excellence. 45
Perhaps the most subtle and least obvious of these steps is the first
- creating appropriate background incentives and, in particular,
mandating information disclosure. In 1986, Congress enacted the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA),46 which included a requirement for a Toxic Release Inven-
tory (TRI).4 7 This provision requires companies to provide the EPA
with estimates of the amounts of toxic chemicals they are releasing
into the environment, and these data are in turn made public. 48 Else-
where the author of this review has argued that "[d]isclosure of TRI
data to the public has been a powerful incentive to promote 'volun-
tary' pollution reductions." 49 The PCEQ-TQM Report provides a
good deal of evidence to support the thesis that by requiring compa-
nies to disclose information to the public about their toxic pollution,
the government creates a powerful incentive for pollution reductions.
Of the eleven companies participating in the demonstration projects,
at least four specifically mention reducing the release of TRI chemicals
as one of the goals of their efforts (pp. 46, 58, 66, 76, 94), and others
targeted reductions in the use of chemicals such as trichloroethylene
(TCE) that are on the TRI inventory without specifically mentioning
TRI (pp. 62-64).
In addition, the PCEQ-TQM Report notes that one of the major
benefits to the participating companies was "improved public accept-
ance" (p. 9):
DuPont noted that probably the single greatest motivating factor in un-
dertaking a QEM program was the enhancement of its Beaumont, Texas,
facility's public image. The Beaumont site's designation as the second
highest source in Texas on EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) pro-
pelled the company to effect process changes, even though it does not
believe that deep-well discharge of ammonium sulfate is detrimental to
the environment. [p. 9]
In the aggregate, the recent reductions in the release of toxic chemicals
to the environment, accomplished "voluntarily" under public pressure
stimulated by the TRI inventory, are probably many times larger than
the reductions achieved over twenty years of traditional standard-set-
ting regulation of air toxics.50
45. Elizabeth Kirschner, AIChE Engineers Offer Solutions, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 19, 1992,
at 10 (stating that EPA "industry award program for overall environmental excellence" follows
in the wake of the success of the Green Lights and 33/50 programs).
46. Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. 3, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(1988)).
47. EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988).
48. EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988).
49. Elliott & Thomas, supra note 18, § 17.1(B)(3), at 1270.
50. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REP. No. 21K-1006, COMMUNICATIONS & PuB.
AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP: EPA's FIRST Two YEARS IN THE BUSH ADMINIS-
TRATION 4 (May 1991) (noting that nine major petrochemical manufacturers have agreed to
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Not only have companies learned that public pressure can be an
effective regulatory tool against them, particularly if the company sells
in the consumer goods marketplace, but environmentalists have
learned that lesson as well. In the early days of the environmental
movement in the 1970s, environmental activists turned to law, and
particularly to the courts, as their "primary tool for environmental
reform." 51 The theory was that environmentalists and the public
could pressure politicians to pass laws that would mandate regulators
to adopt regulations that environmentalists could then go to court to
enforce to make polluters do something about their pollution. Increas-
ingly, that logic has proved cumbersome - as the structure of the
preceding sentences was intended to demonstrate. Frustrated with the
slow pace of traditional, legalistic standard-setting regulation, today's
environmentalists are increasingly engaging in direct regulation of pol-
luters. Rather than going to the government to seek leverage over pol-
luters, activists use their credibility with the public to go directly to
the polluter to negotiate changes in behavior on the public's behalf.52
V
Much that is valuable and interesting in the PCEQ-TQM Report
will not come as a surprise to specialists in the environmental area.
There has been a growing consensus in the field for some time that
incentives offer distinct advantages as regulatory tools over traditional
command-and-control regulatory standards, 53 at least when combined
with standards into a composite or hybrid system, in which regulatory
standards establish minimum requirements and an added layer of in-
centives encourages polluters to innovate and go beyond the minimum
required by law.5 4 Similarly, there is a strong and growing consensus
that redesigning processes to prevent pollution, rather than cleaning it
up afterwards with end-of-pipe controls, is cheaper and more efficient
in many instances.55 The PCEQ-TQM Report provides interesting
and valuable case studies that support these familiar propositions, but
where the report makes its own unique and original contribution is in
reduce their emissions of selected toxics into the environment by almost 83%, or 9.5 million
pounds, by December 1993).
51. SHABECOFF, supra note 3, at 133.
52. See, e.g., John Holusha, Environmentalists Try To Move the Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1993, § 4, at 5.
53. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1333 (1985); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regu-
lation: A New Era From An Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Colloquy, supra note 41.
54. See supra note 34.
55. See generally Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. VI, subtit. F,
§§ 6601-6610, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-321 to -327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109
(Supp. III 1991)).
1852 [Vol. 92:1840
HeinOnline -- 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1852 1993-1994
Environmental TQM
linking pollution prevention with the techniques of Total Quality
Management.
TQM is an approach to analyzing and managing complex organi-
zations developed by the late W. Edwards Deming. A statistician by
training, Deming emphasized the design and continuous improvement
of systems to increase quality, which he insisted could be measured
and defined as satisfying the needs of the customer.56 One of Dem-
ing's central premises was that problems are caused, not by workers,
but by the design of the system, and that it is everyone's job to im-
prove continuously - to invent and reinvent - the system's design.57
In addition, Deming maintained that it was impossible to ensure the
quality of a product by an inspection at the end of the production line;
rather, quality had to be designed and built into the product at every
step of the production process. 58 Deming's ideas were particularly in-
fluential in postwar Japan, which adopted many of his principles and
in 1951 established the Deming Prize as Japanese industry's most
prestigious award. In recent years, many U.S. companies have
adopted Deming's principles. Building on the pioneering work of the
Global Environmental Management Initiative, 59 many U.S. companies
have also found Deming's ideas particularly useful for reducing
pollution.60
The PCEQ-TQM Report is especially helpful in explaining in con-
crete terms how to use TQM tools to develop an effective pollution
prevention program. A short appendix to the report (app. D) explains
in clear, accessible terms how to use five basic TQM tools - the fish-
bone diagram, the control chart, the histogram, the Pareto chart, and
the flow chart - and how to adapt them to analyze and eliminate
sources of pollution (pp. 95-102). Moreover, the experiences of the
eleven companies at twelve different sites described in the PCEQ-
TQM Report (app. B) sites prove that TQM works.
56. Numerous books, articles, lectures, and even a PBS television program are now available
about Dr. Deming's "Total Quality Management" philosophy. Two widely available references
are RAFAEL AGUAYO, DR. DEMING: THE AMERICAN WHO TAUGHT THE JAPANESE ABOUT
QUALITY (1990), and MARY WALTON, THE DEMING MANAGEMENT METHOD (1986). Deming
himself wrote two books on his management methods: W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE
CRISIS (1986), and W. EDWARDS DEMING, QUALITY, PRODUCTIVITY, AND COMPETITIVE PO-
SITION (1982). Two expositions ofbasic TQM principles are now available in the legal literature:
Elliott, supra note 16, and Paul R. Verkeil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the
Nineties, 45 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
57. See WALTON, supra note 56, at 66-67; Elliott, supra note 16 at 175-76.
58. See WALTON, supra note 56, at 60; Elliott, supra note 16, at 177.
59. GLOBAL ENVTL. MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, CORPORATE QUALITY/ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT: THE FIRST CONFERENCE - PROCEEDINGS (1991). GEMI is generally
credited with being the first to see the relationship between TQM and pollution prevention.
60. See Emily T. Smith, Doing It for Mother Earth, BUS. WK., Oct. 25, 1991, at 44, 44 ("By
linking quality and enviionmental goals, companies from Xerox and Procter & Gamble to Al-
lied-Signal and IBM have found that they can cut pollution and improve compliance, often while
lowering their environmental costs.").
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"Pollution prevention pays" has become a popular slogan in some
quarters recently. The PCEQ-TQM Report finds that while not every
pollution prevention effort ends up saving money, many do. 6t As for-
mer EPA administrator William K. Reilly was fond of saying - with
apologies to Wordsworth - "A pollutant is just a resource in the
wrong place."
61.
The financial incentives for applying TQM to pollution prevention can be significant.
Several of the companies involved in the demonstration projects showed cost savings after
the implementation of a QEM system. For example, successful solid waste minimization
efforts at Procter & Gamble's Mehoopany plant are yielding a total value of $25,000,000 per
year.
GE found that substituting floor wax for a freon-based mold release saved approximately
$15,000. By year end, the company estimates that 1,1,1 trichloroethane use will be de-
creased by 95 percent, saving approximately $30,000. The introduction of a closed-loop
cooling system and three process changes has reduced water consumption by 300,000 gal-
lons/week with estimated annual savings on water and sewage costs of approximately
$30,000.
DuPont noted that when its project first began, costs were seen as a barrier, yet the
results are an incentive for future programs. Initially, DuPont believed that reducing excess
ammonia would cost them money; however, the project has saved approximately $1,000,000
a year in manufacturing costs and reduced ammonium sulfate generation by 60,000,000
pounds/year. The savings are a result of decreased expenditures on raw materials and
decreased waste disposal taxes.
P. 8.
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